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Between Reconciliation and the Reactivation 
of Past Conﬂ icts in Europe: 
Rethinking Social Memory Paradigms
GEORGES MINK*
Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique, Paris
Abstract: Europe is grounded, from all sides, in traces of old inter-state and 
ethnic conﬂ icts. Experience has proved that they can still be re-activated in 
spite of various forms of resolution in the past. History is welcome in the 
present, and we can observe mobilisation among agents, populations of vic-
tims, or despoiled groups, which have been forgotten or forced into silence 
through post-conﬂ ictual issues. Various interest groups, political parties, or 
states, build up memorial resources that they incorporate in their actions list 
of historicist strategies, with the aim of ‘recycling’ the representations of the 
symbolic pasts into contemporary political games. These mobilisations meet 
the reconciliation trends coming from society (for example, informal groups, 
NGOs, and so on), or are taken in charge by national and international institu-
tions – which are becoming more and more routine – especially under the in-
ﬂ uence of the circulation of ‘good’ models of the paciﬁ cation of resentments, 
containing a highly normative tone. The question is to know whether, in spite 
of the apparent heterogeneity of this phenomenon, the historicist games do 
constitute a common indicator of the state of political regimes, especially de-
mocracies, and also of the strength of that supranational construction called 
the EU. This question necessitates the revisiting of the dominant concepts in 
the ﬁ eld of the political sociology of memory. The international circulation of 
reconciliation grammars, and the fact that memory issues are being torn out 
of their national frameworks and exploited in several arenas, both internal 
and external, in order to increase their yield of political resources, are further 
evidence that the paradigms heretofore dominant in the social sciences are 
now at an impasse.
Keywords: Sociology and paradigms of memory, uses of history, Europeani-
sation of politics of history, post-communism, institutions of remembrance, 
grammars of reconciliation, Central Europe 
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 3: 469–490
* Direct all correspondence to: Georges Mink, Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique 
– ISP, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre, Maison Max Weber, F-922001 – Nanterre Cedex, 
e-mail: mink@u-paris10.fr.
soccas2008-3.indb   469 11.8.2008   8:57:58
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 3
470
Time is a strong pain-killer; it sometimes gives the wounded man the impression that his wound 
has healed for all time. But suddenly, ﬁ fteen or twenty years later and for no apparent reason, 
the wound reopens, causing what may be unbearable suffering, before going numb again, freeing 
thought from its embrace. 
Sandor Marai, Les confessions d’un bourgeois
There are times when History reminds me of a theatre storeroom where costumes for very different 
plays are kept. We tend to bring them out according to the needs of the moment.
Henryk Samsonowicz, Polish historian
The end of communism in Eastern Europe worked to renew debates on history 
– namely European history – and reactivated social memory issues. The corre-
lation with the European Union integration process had its own galvanising ef-
fect. The uses made of Europe went beyond learning the acquis communautaire and 
interacting with institutional actors. The window of opportunity offered by the 
pre-enlargement transition period was ﬁ lled with intense symbolic activity both 
inside and outside the countries, activity involving several categories of actor. And 
once the countries had joined the Union, hitherto unknown memory problemat-
ics erupted in the enlarged EU space. The new member countries challenge us to 
take on their heritage of social memory issues: ‘Yes to Europe’, wrote Maria Janion 
[2000], a historian of Polish Romanticism, ‘but we’re coming in with our dead’. 
The recurrence and diversity of social memory phenomena in Europe
The EU space has been enriched with new concerns. It now encompasses mem-
ory issues other than those that rotate around the ‘axis’ of Germany, though they 
are still dominant. Europe has become a theatre of recurring ‘memorial’ move-
ments that are striking out all over, from North to South and East to West, and 
this development persists despite (or perhaps because of) the EU’s routine pol-
icy of encouraging reconciliation acts and arrangements. The Union’s juridical-
normative policies undoubtedly act as a safety valve, periodically relieving ex-
cessive pressure, but they also offer increased visibility to the actors handling 
the conﬂ icts and dissent resulting from the reactivation and re-evaluation of his-
torical ‘ﬁ les’ that seemed deﬁ nitively closed. The most striking example is the 
German Association of Expellees from Poland and the Czech Republic. Their 
purpose is to get the 1945 expulsions recognised as cases of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as 
deﬁ ned for the former Yugoslavia. This amounts to demanding revision of the 
verdicts produced in quite another context, that is, the victory over the Nazi oc-
cupiers [Blaive and Mink 2003]. Moves such as this to reposition a ‘painful’ past 
using norms produced for other situations and events involve a strategy of histori-
cal de-contextualisation. 
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The early 2000s have also witnessed the return to centre stage of popula-
tion categories sacriﬁ ced earlier by the exit ‘pacts’ of their authoritarian regimes; 
for example, victims of Franco in Spain, and victims of the communist political 
police in post-communist countries. These groups are composed of post-conﬂ ict 
generations who feel an imperative to repair the injustice done. Their aim is to 
rehabilitate groups excluded from memorial pacts, those who had to keep quiet 
about their resentment (but not forget it!) so that the authoritarian regime could 
make its exit compromises. 
When perpetrators of political mass murders, often themselves in power, 
seek to ‘efface the traces’ of that crime, we are dealing with extreme forms of 
history and memory ‘manipulation’. This applies to certain countries of former 
Yugoslavia. Such manipulations have the effect of extending the crime after life 
has returned to ‘normal’. They take innumerable forms, such as producing falsi-
ﬁ ed accounts of the events in question, destroying evidence, prohibiting access to 
or destroying archives, repressing or eliminating witnesses, instating censorship 
and criminalising anyone who produces a dissident account.
On the institutional side, arrangements have been developed in many Euro-
pean countries, Eastern as well as Western and Southern, to bring together former 
enemies and produce reconciliation. More generally, a ‘grammar’ of norms and 
rules has been developed for handling post-conﬂ ict situations. These norms 
and rules are indissociable from memory issues. A brief overview provides a 
glimpse of the number and diversity of situations and solutions: managing the 
consequences of armed conﬂ icts (former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland), putting 
an end to authoritarian regimes (Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe), 
putting an end to bilateral heritage conﬂ icts (England/Ireland, Germany/Czech 
Republic, Germany/Poland, Poland/Ukraine, Italy/Slovenia, Greece/Turkey, for 
example.). The arrangements put in place for handling these ‘painful pasts’ are 
likewise extremely heterogeneous, ranging from bilateral commissions of histo-
rians to professionalised peace-keeping activities, and including such solutions 
as speciﬁ c museum projects or intervention in international arenas (Council of 
Europe, OSCE, European Union). This institutional density is sometimes inter-
preted as proof that history, and history as mediated by memory, have been aban-
doned in Europe in favour of legal and administrative regulation. As I see it what 
is actually happening is that partisan memory games are intensifying in an over-
all context of the judiciarisation and criminalisation of individuals and groups 
responsible for violence.1
In some states recently, history has begun to be used explicitly as a govern-
ing instrument. Here the aim is not to improve bilateral relations and the Euro-
pean Union construction – as was the case of the Mitterrand-Kohl couple’s usage 
1 The French philosopher Alain Finkelkraut expresses a similar understanding when he 
calls for denouncing a Europe that ‘has to deﬁ ne itself by law; that is, by ... potentially uni-
versal juridical norms, because it cannot deﬁ ne itself historically’ [Finkelkraut 2006].
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of their countries’ conﬂ ictual past [Rosoux 2001] – but rather to mobilise the elec-
torate of a given party or coalition around what may be described as symbolic yet 
bellicose identity demands, demands made both in the internal political arena 
and to the world at large. In Poland, for example, the political right has begun to 
speak of ‘historical policy’ and intends to make such policy – which it claims has 
been neglected until now by the ‘successors’ of the Old Regime (the insinuation 
being that those successors are ‘accomplices to the crimes of the past’)2 – a con-
stituent component of its public policy.
Up against the proliferating use of conﬂ ictual symbolic pasts, Europe (the 
EU) offers its model of peaceful co-existence among former enemies. But in seek-
ing to absolutise peace through consensus, well-meaning European politicians 
have often simply deferred recollection of the conﬂ icts in question by one or two 
generations. By integrating memory of the historical-political past into the rou-
tine canons of democracy, they have indeed limited or neutralised the risk that 
the violence of those heritages will return. But the problem with reconciliation-
ism – in Europe as elsewhere – is that everything seems to have been arranged 
to make it possible to get out of conﬂ ict impasses and construct democracy but 
nothing has been put in place to prevent or soothe later competitive struggles 
between the actors in question. To better grasp the sociological issues involved 
in these transformations, we ﬁ rst have to redeﬁ ne the concepts common to the 
various areas in which reconciliation policies are applied, and then analyse the 
games the actors play. 
Redeﬁ ning concepts of and approaches to social memory games3
The range of different developments in the area of social memory in Europe 
shows that at some point in time actors will re-enact historicisation strategies; 
that is, strategies for historicising conﬂ ict-generating heritages. The aim of these 
strategies may be to produce consensus (paciﬁ cation of social relations) or, on the 
contrary, to reopen certain aspects of a repressed history (here the aim is to ob-
tain distinction, symbolic recognition, and integration into national narratives); it 
may also be to escape responsibility for crimes by ‘erasing the traces of a criminal 
past’.
2 Not wishing to be surpassed on this point, the Polish political left opted for a parade 
that would have approximately the same tone: ‘We must have our own historical policy’, 
wrote the leader of the Democratic Left Alliance, Wojciech Olejniczak (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
7 November 2006). ‘It seems that history in Poland today is the exclusive property of the 
right. The left must not let itself be paralysed by this ... It must recall all that is worthy and 
important in its tradition ... In politics in general we speak of the past while thinking of the 
present and the future.’
3 Roughly speaking, the French academic ﬁ eld of memory studies is dominated by three 
paradigms that correspond to three different disciplinary approaches. First, there is the 
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The concept of historicisation strategies is crucial to understanding memory 
issues and the behaviour of the actors involved, together with institutional di-
versity. This is a variant of symbolic politics; the underlying conviction is that 
certain ‘representations’ of historical facts, internalised through socialisation that 
is either formal (schooling, for example) or informal (within the family), have the 
collective mobilisation potential required for getting the group using the strategy 
the political inﬂ uence it desires. 
What is the point here? History as scholarly facts or remembered ones has 
always been used to legitimate or de-legitimate. And recently we have been see-
ing a wave of memory-centred social movements (sometimes qualiﬁ ed as ‘revi-
sionist’ and always involving a ‘revisiting’ of the knowledge that has been ac-
quired by historical science) that call into question the established legitimacy of 
certain memory representations, namely those pertaining to the Second World 
War [Losurdo 1996; Kopeček 2008]. This is due to a number of factors, including 
the end of the great ideological interpretation systems, systems which allowed 
psychoanalysis-tinged philosophical approach, developed primarily by Paul Ricoeur. This 
approach distinguishes between ‘clinical and ... therapeutic categories borrowed principal-
ly from psychoanalysis’ and ‘forms of the manipulation or instrumentalisation of memory, 
within the framework of a critique of ideology’ [Ricoeur 2000: 83] – what Ricoeur calls 
abuses of memory and forgetting. Finally, there is the dimension that the author himself 
designates as ‘explicitly ethico-political’, the only one he approves of: the duty of memory. 
He covers the whole ‘path from one level to the next ... from one ﬁ gure to the next charac-
terising the uses and abuses of memory, from blocked memory to forced memory, passing 
through manipulated memory’ [Ricoeur 2000: 83]. The second paradigm, which belongs to 
sociological tradition and is chronologically ﬁ rst, is Maurice Halbwachs’ ‘cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire’ (social frames of memory) [1994 [1925], 1997 [1950]], an approach later reﬁ ned by 
its critics, particularly Roger Bastide [1960] and more recently Marie-Claude Lavabre [2000]. 
The key concepts here are ‘collective memory’, group memory, and the social frames of 
memory. Emphasis is on social conditions for the elaboration and transmission of memory 
representations that create group cohesion. The third paradigm is used in the discipline of 
history and is directly linked to the name of Pierre Nora and the immense collective work 
he directed, Les lieux de mémoire [1984] (translated into English as Realms of Memory, 1997). 
With regard to these three traditional paradigms or approaches, we can make the following 
paradoxical observation: there have never been as many social science studies of memory, 
and yet a great number of memory phenomena cannot be explained by any of these ap-
proaches. The normative European framework for resolving the after-effects of conﬂ ictual 
pasts on social memory actually exacerbates this paradox. The proliferation of memory is-
sues that are correlated either with a desire to reach reconciliation after a violent inter-state 
or inter-ethnic conﬂ ict or, on the contrary, to reopen a historical ﬁ le and change or at least 
challenge the verdict and, more generally, to make use of the conﬂ ictual past in today’s po-
litical contests, points up the necessity of trying to ﬁ nd a new explanatory paradigm. The 
international circulation of reconciliation grammars, and the fact that memory issues are 
being torn out of their national frameworks and exploited in several arenas, both internal 
and external, in order to increase their yield of political resources, are further evidence that 
the paradigms heretofore dominant in the social sciences are now at an impasse. For more 
on the different uses of memory, see also G. Mink and  L. Neumayer [2007].
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for clear, seemingly immutable identiﬁ cation of victims and persecutors, winners 
and losers, and the dual temptation to make the victims of both sides equal and 
develop new historical categories and rankings. The various moves to rewrite 
history are very closely linked to the arrival on the scene of subsequent genera-
tions as well as the ‘archives revolution’: the opening of archives in post-commu-
nist Europe (some without ofﬁ cial consent or regulation) and more generally, the 
new availability of archive material as prescribed inaccessibility periods come to 
an end. All this is being done in a ﬂ uid context in which behaviour and values 
are proliferating that threaten to call into question the dominant understanding 
that democracy has become deﬁ nitively universal. In general, that vision is be-
ing given a rough time, here by the eruption of unconventional behaviour; there 
by assaults on the continuity of historical legitimation; elsewhere by the rise of 
xenophobic discourses and movements. Criticism and heretofore unmentionable 
subjects of debate – repressed until now, prohibited or censured – are cropping 
up all over. Those who are speaking out in these instances show a superb indif-
ference to the standard, routine frameworks of representation, negotiation and 
political legality. An increasing number of ﬁ rmly rooted national politicians who 
have acquired legitimacy at the polls in democratic contests are giving in to the 
temptation to make high-risk anti-democratic speeches and statements. And new 
categories of actors are alternately playing system and anti-system games, strug-
gling thereby to call into question the historical foundations of political systems 
by changing people’s representations of those systems. These actors are taking 
advantage of the many scheduled national elections – and, for broader European 
issues, of the growth-related and functional difﬁ culties the European Union is 
having – to make themselves heard.4
If we want to make sense of the strong rise in historicisation discourse, we 
need to go beyond the discipline of history. While historians express amazement 
at the fragility of their ﬁ eld and the recent incursions into their professional mo-
nopoly [Hartog and Revel 2003], what this new situation requires above all is the 
analytic insight of political specialists, sociologists, and jurists. Because behind 
the proliﬁ c talk about History, what is really at issue is not History (an account 
4 The Armenian diaspora, for example, has been trying for nearly ninety years to sensitise 
international opinion to the early 20th-century massacre of Armenians and have it quali-
ﬁ ed as a crime – with mixed results. Suddenly, Europe has begun to show more interest. 
Memory of this mass murder has been reactivated by the increased proﬁ tability of using it 
in the context of the polemic around admission of Turkey to the EU. Similarly, Ukrainians 
have always preserved the memory of the Great Famine, but up until now the geopolitical 
context was not propitious to reactivating that memory. Why is it being reactivated now? 
Simply because this move ﬁ ts with the confrontation between Ukrainians in favour of 
a Europeanised Ukraine, namely, the supporters of President Viktor Yuchenko, and the 
supporters of Viktor Yanukovich, who are loyal to Russia. Kiev’s historicisation strategy of 
evoking and denouncing this tragic episode is hardly to Russia’s liking because it works to 
mobilise voters against the pro-Russian candidate.
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constructed in compliance with a number of pre-established rules shared ideally 
by all members of the historians’ corporation) but rather uses of representations 
of history, and the new actors who are developing and enacting those uses. The 
idea of the return of the past, the belated return to certain painful pasts thought 
to have been ‘obliterated’, raises more questions for a political specialist than a 
historian, as shown by the example of France’s supposed ‘forgetting’ of Vichy 
for several decades after 1945. Annie Collovald explains: ‘This episode of French 
political history has always been present in the social uses of various actors with 
an interest in how it was interpreted – historians and politicians – because from 
the outset it constituted an intellectual and practical resource for deﬁ ning their 
position and supporting their reading of national history’ [Collovald 2006]. This 
seems an obvious point, and we may ask if it is not due to the fact that forget-
ting, too, is a strategy, whether conscious or not, as Régine Robin [2002] put it; as 
is pointing a ﬁ nger at certain actors for having worked to efface historical facts 
from social memory. Paul Ricoeur [2000] recognises the existence of strategies 
of forgetting (omission, negligence, blindness) but understands them as involv-
ing ‘the class of non-action’. The main weakness of typologies that combine psy-
choanalysis and hermeneutics is that they accentuate memory ‘invisibility’ and 
repression (‘obliteration’ in Ricoeur’s typology [2000]) almost as if they were the 
equivalent of inaction on the part of memory: ‘In this way action is prevented 
from continuing by forgetting’ [ibid.: 653]. The fact is that memory material that 
has been ‘forced into silence’ continues to be part of actors’ games even if, in the 
current situation, the only places it can survive are the memory niches cultivated 
by particular, minority actors. Those who are forced to forget and those who force 
others to forget keep the memory games going by using the constraint of silence 
itself to create a new space of interaction opportunities.
The ‘blank page’, an extreme form of ‘obliteration’ historicising strategy (a 
sort of anti-history or anti-memory), involves the violent or surreptitious ampu-
tation of a piece of collective history and the memory reﬂ ecting that history. As 
mentioned, this is practised by criminals in an attempt to clear their names and es-
cape being investigated and punished for their crimes. Behind these ways of pro-
ceeding are powerful actors, often state ofﬁ ce-holders, who use coercive means 
to impose their law and legitimacy. At times the constraint of preventing people 
from memorising something – particularly as practised by the Argentine torturers 
of the Mechanical Naval School of Buenos Aires, who permanently blindfolded 
their victims during detention, then transformed the torture spaces to make it im-
possible for the investigation commission to investigate – is countered by ‘memo-
ry of the invisible’. The smells or sounds of a place – olfactory and aural memory 
– often replace visual memory and allow torture and disappearance policy survi-
vors to reconstitute the material aspects of the violence they were subjected to and 
thereby help museographers create a monument for socialising memory. 
Historicising strategies, then, play an important role in regulating the be-
haviour, choices and arrangements developed by institutions. Behind memory 
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games and the development of arrangements for handling post-conﬂ ict periods, 
all of which produce complex actor networks, actors are increasingly likely to 
use representations of the past, especially if that past is conﬂ ictual. We should 
ask, of course, how proﬁ table such strategic choices are, but proﬁ tability is hard 
to measure given that actors make their choices empirically, as a function of the 
proﬁ t and rewards they think they can expect. Their moves are aimed to procure 
them a better political position, an election victory; to designate and stigmatise 
the enemy, strengthen their client relations, consolidate identitary referents, etc. 
Their choices will necessarily correspond to timely situational contexts that will 
increase the probability of attaining their goals. 
We have seen how a context of conditionality, which holds out to second-
ary political actors the prospect of making a breakthrough, may annihilate long, 
painstaking efforts to achieve reconciliation. The example of Germany and its 
neighbours is emblematic here. It sounds paradoxical, but what rewound the his-
torical clock in the centre of Europe was the context of eastward enlargement. In 
the West, meanwhile, the rewriting of history was induced by collective mobilisa-
tions and interactions among politicians. The competition around memory and 
the associated spiral of intemperate statements (in 2002 the Czech Prime Minis-
ter Miloš Zeman went so far as to dub the Sudeten Germans a ‘Fifth Column’) 
became manifest in the heart of Central Europe in the quadrilateral formed by 
Austria, Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland; it was then taken up in Hun-
gary and Slovakia. The agitation is persisting throughout the ﬁ rst decade of the 
21st century and the end is nowhere in sight, despite the fact that all the countries 
involved are now EU members.
After 1945, the dominant dogma was the one imposed by the victorious 
states. To guarantee lasting peace in Europe, they authorised the displacement of 
German and Hungarian minorities – as well as a Polish minority, which some-
times goes unmentioned. The point was to create mono-ethnic national entities. 
After 1989 and the break-up of Yugoslavia, with its succession of exterminations 
and ethnically based expulsions, and given the founding principles of the Euro-
pean Union – namely, respect for the rights of minorities to live in peace wherever 
they have resided for a long time – that dogma became obsolete. 
In Central Europe, in 2001–2002 the ﬁ rst sign of the conﬂ ict was pressure to 
invalidate the ‘Beneš Decrees’, a legal expulsion act, and a symbol of the hard-
ships of the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia. The episodes 
of this painful history, cultivated by minorities who up until then could not be 
heard, were suddenly projected into the glare of current events, or even more 
paradoxically, they actually became news. At the time, the development was seen 
as merely a bout of local fever, facilitated by the contradictory ways of handling 
History within Czechoslovakia. But everything changed with the ﬁ ring up of Ger-
man-Polish passions on the same issue. The dykes put up earlier to contain this 
source of conﬂ ict have all burst, and the issue has spread geographically through-
out Central Europe. The conﬂ ict has crystallised around the desire of the expelled 
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group to ﬁ nd its place in the collective memory of the last years of the war, with 
a project for a museum in Berlin, a centre for expellees. But memory pressure has 
not stopped there. In December 2006, the Association of East Prussians, made 
up of former landowners in the region of Pomerania, ﬁ led 22 petitions with the 
European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg to recover property conﬁ scated in 
1945. In response, a number of Poles formed an association to demand a revision 
of the Polish-German treaty of 1991that would include a clause protecting their 
ownership rights for the contested properties. We sense in the judiciarised ag-
gressiveness on both sides a will to reposition themselves and their identities and 
to redistribute quantities of political inﬂ uence. The two extremes are both seeking 
to draw maximum political proﬁ t from this interaction. 
The agitation of the memory of expelled Germans – the historicising strat-
egy being, as explained, to ‘de-contextualise’ what happened to them, extracting 
it from its historical context; namely the crushing of the Nazi armies – amounts 
to dissociating the causes and effects of the war. And it constitutes proof that 
what, from 1960 to 1990, seemed a deﬁ nitive, stable balance of power, attained 
by means of a moral or normative approach to the conﬂ ictual past in the form of 
pardon and reconciliation policies, is in fact subject to ﬂ uctuation as a function of 
the political situation of the moment. An ‘asymmetrical’ balance of power – even 
if that balance seems frozen – is in itself a resource that can be seized at an op-
portune moment; that is, a moment when it appears proﬁ table to recycle the past. 
This is clearly attested by the move to present certain episodes of controversial 
history as scandals, and by the spiralling of memory issues around the 1933–1945 
German heritage. 
Impending EU enlargement was the occasion that enabled a particular cat-
egory of politician to spring to life, politicians who simultaneously play by the 
system and against it, who are both for and against democracy. Examples are Jörg 
Haider in Austria, Andrzej Lepper in Poland, István Csurka in Hungary, and Erika 
Steinbach in Germany. These politicians all seized the opportunity offered by na-
tional uncertainty about being admitted to the Union to reawaken memory of old 
disputes and the historical metaphors characterising them. The act of blackmail 
that consisted in threatening to block European enlargement was a major issue in 
the period of unilateral conditionality imposed by the EEC/EU on countries wish-
ing to join. It is true that these politicians’ political longevity depended on that of 
their political strategies. Still, this historicising game, which called for repairing a 
past injustice (or stopping short of committing one by taking account of the past), 
aimed to capitalise on a diffuse feeling of frustration present in the memory of 
mobilisable populations ready to manifest that feeling [Mink 2005].
The current situation also requires us to reﬂ ect on the knowledge acquired 
by sociology of memory. It seems to me that the widely accepted distinction in 
sociology between historical memory and ‘live’ memory [Lavabre 1996] needs 
to be supplemented. What we are trying to investigate here is in fact ‘reactive’ 
memory, in the sense that the actors who promote historicising strategies are aim-
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ing to achieve political effects by ‘recycling’ proﬁ table memorised material (prof-
itable in that it is socialised and emotionally charged) in reaction to situations of 
uncertainty and conditionality. What interests me in collective memory, deﬁ ned 
as the ‘point of intersection between a set of representations of the past shared 
by individuals (memories and acquired knowledge) and seemingly deﬁ nitive ac-
counts of history – i.e. historical memory (as distinct from the science of history)’ 
[Lavabre 1996] – is its capacity to be reactivated and invested with current issues. 
This means that the past only counts if it is in some way relevant for the strategies 
of present-day actors. In this connection the Polish intellectual Adam Michnik 
speaks of the ‘selﬁ shness of pain’, selﬁ shness that works to underline certain 
episodes of the lived past with a glaring highlighter while others go unnoticed. 
Here we encounter a typology recently applied in international relations stud-
ies  [Rosoux 2001], distinguishing between the weight of the past (the past that 
 people were subjected to) and the choice of a past (the past used to political ends). 
This is a useful distinction, but the dichotomy loses its effectiveness if we take 
into account the fact that the reason we choose to focus on certain components of 
the past is precisely because they weigh so heavily. People choose a certain past 
in order to use it and to proﬁ t by doing so [Stora 2002]. 
The diversity of actors who have appeared in connection with social mem-
ory, and more importantly their marked connections to partisan politics, move us 
to examine the individuals who have chosen to become involved in such political 
contests. They use the symbolic past to confront their political competitors and 
succeed against them. In this category, which ranges from party leaders and ac-
tivists and includes elected ofﬁ cials (including members of parliament), journal-
ists and judges, what we observe, curiously enough, is the increasing inﬂ uence 
of a profession that we usually situate elsewhere; namely, historians, or rather 
a historian subgroup: militant historians. Militant historians no longer feel any 
inhibitions about being partisan or citing partisan ﬁ liation. A number of profes-
sional historians are using the resources of their status to partisan ends. In fact, 
they deliberately use their hybrid status to increase the proﬁ table impact of their 
historicising strategies, combining their academic job with the legitimacy of their 
work in the archives, their status as experts, etc. This is also characteristic of the 
generation gap within the historian corporation, namely in post-communist Eu-
rope. For the young ‘knights’ of historical moralisation the only thing that counts 
is facts (behaviour), if possible attested by archives. They are not interested in the 
context of the facts. And it matters little who compiled the archive – even if it was 
compiled by the persecutors and their accomplices, namely, the regime agents 
in charge of informing on particular individuals. As the authors of the police re-
ports, the second set is granted the same status as professional academic histori-
ans, and in some cases their opinions actually supplant those of the professionals. 
Factual and research accounts or investigations that are in any way complex are 
rejected: a traitor is a traitor; a hero a hero. This attitude, meant to be perceived 
as cool and objective, is nonetheless rooted in moral convictions. Some historians, 
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above all members of the pre-1989 generation, try to extricate themselves from 
memory games by citing their scholarship and scholarly approach. Yet those his-
torians, too, willingly or not, are playing the memory game, if only through their 
epistemological concern to protect their professional ﬁ eld in the name of its mo-
nopoly on historical ‘truth’ (the code of ethics) or its protocol of methodological 
rules (the epistemological code) [Pomian 2006]. 
Our immediate concern here, memory issues in the framework of the Eu-
ropean Union, requires another conceptual inﬂ ection. Everywhere in Europe 
there are lieux de mémoire [Nora 1984; Brossat et al. 1990]. It is precisely these lieux 
– places – that are being reactivated today to enable people to recover or discover 
identitary touchstones. But sometimes the reactivation proceeds by dividing, 
reopening ‘wounds’ in the name of a need for distinction, and sometimes, on 
the contrary, through moves to prevent division by applying a dynamic, vigor-
ous therapy of reconciliation and pardon. In both cases, fossilised, ﬁ xed places 
of memory become live resource reservoirs, a point of departure for new initia-
tives (pertaining to reactive memory) whose purpose is to modify social reality 
and the settings in which those initiatives are staged. Because these ‘places’ are 
in fact dynamic, it might be preferable to speak of ‘veins’ or ‘seams’ of memory 
(the author’s term is gisement mémoriel), as of a mineral resource in a mine – a 
concept not inconsistent with the concept of places of memory. The terms desig-
nate a symbol around which memory can rally, rather than a speciﬁ c place. For 
the Polish-Ukrainian conﬂ ict of the 1940s there is Volhynia (a region that was the 
site of Polish massacres), and the ‘Vistula action’, a synonym for the massacre and 
displacement of Ukrainians by Poles. Germans and Poles have their eyes trained 
on Silesia and Pomerania; Czechs and Germans on the Sudeten area. However, 
texts such as the Beneš or the Bierut decrees,5 legal bases for population transfers, 
can also be rallying points for memory. For rightist parties in post-communist 
democracies, the ‘roundtable talks’ at the close of the communist period are an 
inexhaustible vein of dissensus resources, despite the fact that they are attached 
to no particular geographical place. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also functions 
as a reservoir of useful references for anti-Soviet actors. Various actors draw the 
symbolic material required for fuelling political contests from just such ‘territo-
rial or extra-territorial imaginaries’. 
The fact that the European Union construction process itself has been con-
ducted under the sign of reconciliation constitutes a prescription for homogeni-
sation. In reality, the reconciliationist impulses are being contested by multiple 
actors. The pull of the universal can actually be used as a resource for creating 
division and heterogeneity. Wanting to get one’s own collective identity heritage 
incorporated into the historical heritage of Europe in the name of its universality 
(see the debate on giving special mention to ‘Christian roots’ in the preamble to 
the European Union Constitutional Treaty) may have the unsought and unde-
5 Named for Boleslaw Bierut, secretary general of the Polish Communist Party until 1953.
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sired effect of renationalising memory. In any case, the space of Europe (the EU 
and beyond) is run through with a multitude of stagings of conﬂ ictual memories, 
memories around which multiform actors compete. We can now analyse the rea-
sons for this, while inventorying the new developments. 
Divided Europe’s past: a resource for memory adjustment strategies
The symbol rather than the historical fact of the ‘Yalta betrayal’ is part of reactive 
Eastern European memory, and politicians in Central Europe seem to consider 
recycling it a proﬁ table proposition. This explains why one last semantic polemic 
around Europe’s ‘painful’ past developed at the time the eight post-communist 
countries were joining the EU-15. Central Europeans and their symbolic spokes-
persons expressed opposition to the European lexicon traditionally used for the 
circumstance: Was it not more appropriate to speak of uniﬁ cation than enlarge-
ment? For former dissidents such as Bronislaw Geremek or Václav Havel, this 
was a kind of gallant last stand, the last opportunity to display the obstination 
that had characterised them throughout the period of technocratic negotiation 
imposed by Brussels. They recalled the ‘historical debt’ owed to their part of the 
continent, claiming that their ‘return to Europe’ was legitimate reparation for the 
Western sin of Yalta.6 The Central European countries had constructed a strategy 
around the West’s ‘debt’ to the East in order to increase pressure on the EU and 
create a demand for memory adjustment and compensatory reparation. To in-
crease the proﬁ tability of this strategy they wagered on the apparent opposition 
between present-day ‘norms’ and historical ‘values’; the clear intention was to 
make the West feel guilty. Throughout the negotiation period, insistent use was 
made of the debt argument. In February 2001 a Eurosceptic Polish newspaper 
denounced ‘highly insufﬁ cient EU compensation for what Poland did for Europe 
beginning in 1920’ (Nasz Dziennik, 19 February, 2001). The point was to recall the 
role the Poles had played in holding off the Red Army as it strove to realise Len-
in’s goal of exporting Bolshevik revolution westward. Some historians were more 
circumspect. Janusz Tazbir noted with irony: ‘History in Poland ... has not been 
a mere science of the past but a sort of bill we wave under Europe’s nose. An un-
paid bill?’ (Tygodnik Powszechny, 26 July 1998).
This example illustrates how East European actors seized and deployed 
the opportunities available to them – ﬁ rst in the period preceding EU integra-
tion, then after 1 May 2004 – by means of national-international scale games. 
Historicising strategies can be used in several of the international arenas where 
European-scope norms of symbolic recognition and reconciliation are deﬁ ned. 
6 Asked in an interview with the French daily Libération whether ‘we can speak of the 
“reuniﬁ cation” of Europe in connection with Union enlargement’, the historian Jacques 
Le Goff answered in no uncertain terms: ‘Europe never was united’ (Libération, 3 May 
2004: 6). 
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Those strategies bring their protagonists a double reward: recognised status in 
the international arena and patriotic legitimacy ‘at home’.
Several memory-related ‘causes’ of unequal weight were deliberately in-
troduced into European-level arenas. The following survey shows considerable 
variation in the results of this strategy. 
On the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Gdansk Social Accords and 
the birth of the free Solidarnosc union, the Poles demanded that August 31 be de-
clared ‘European Solidarity Day’ and ﬁ gure as such on the European Parliament 
calendar. These demands were met. But intentional historicising actions run into 
all the stumbling blocks of rational choice; they can be thrown off course or prove 
counterproductive in unforeseen ways. The 60th anniversary of the Hungarian 
insurrection in Budapest, crushed by the Red Army, offered the Hungarians an 
opportunity to stand up to Western Europe as the most legitimate victim of all the 
countries subjected to communist rule. The opportunity was especially rich given 
that at the time, France and Great Britain had bartered indifference and inaction 
in response to the Soviet crackdown on the Hungarian liberation movement for 
Soviet silence on their battle for the Suez Canal; they could therefore be made to 
feel some shame. Moreover, a few of the former communist satellites were under 
the inﬂ uence of powerful communist parties busy disseminating the myth of So-
viet humanism. Dozens of conferences were organised, from Brussels to Warsaw 
by way of Paris and London; embassies were active in the cause, and in Hungary’s 
case, so was the state. Given the fact that at almost exactly the same time, European 
ofﬁ cials were pushing hard in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) to get the communist regime condemned and 
equated with Hitler’s, Hungary’s memory game should have reaped it exceptional 
proﬁ ts. As it happened, however, in autumn 2006 the same reference to 1956 was 
being used as a resource in a partisan left-right contest in the national Hungarian 
arena, at just the moment the left-centre-left coalition in power had been weak-
ened by the Socialist prime minister’s admission – made off the record in a closed 
meeting, but recorded on tape and later leaked to the public – that his government 
had lied to the Hungarian people. The Hungarian right and far right acted out 
the events of 1956 in the street in front of the Parliament, thereby appropriating 
a historic and apparently consensual date – and discrediting the left. This in turn 
partially deprived Hungary of the returns they had sought from their external or 
extra-national movement. Just as counter-productive was the historicising action 
undertaken by the Poles in 2005 in connection with a painful episode in Polish-
Russian relations. On March 7 of that year, Polish MEPs asked EU Parliament pres-
ident Josep Borrell for a minute’s silence to commemorate the 1940 Stalin-ordered 
Red Army massacre of Polish army ofﬁ cers at Katyn. The MEPs had decided to 
observe a minute of silence for the victims of the terrorist bombing in Madrid (an-
niversary March 11), but the Polish request was rejected on the grounds that there 
should not be too many commemorations. At that point, the representative of the 
Polish MEPs Jacek Saryusz Wolski made the following, highly signiﬁ cant remark: 
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‘We have to educate Western Europe. We can’t tolerate this historical amnesia.’ He 
then conﬁ rmed that the demand was part of a vaster memory adjustment strategy: 
‘All MEPs from former Eastern countries, whatever their political group, demand 
a debate .... We think it’s important to recall that for half of the continent, the defeat 
of Nazi Germany signiﬁ ed the start of communist occupation.’ During the 60th 
anniversary commemorations of the end of the Second World War, the historicis-
ing game of appropriating the victory over the Nazis (see, for example, the con-
troversy around the day the war ended: May 8 for Western Europe, May 9 for the 
Russians) clearly showed how greatly representations of the year 1945 vary as we 
move from Moscow to Warsaw to Riga to Berlin to London. They also demonstrat-
ed that this anniversary remains a legitimation card in geopolitical competition, 
and is also used to activate identity reﬂ exes, pro- or anti-Russian, depending on 
the country. The East-West memory split here eroded and undermined partisan 
solidarity – as did the proposed ‘Yalta resolution’ meant to commemorate the end 
of the war. Martin Schultz, president of the Socialist group in the European Parlia-
ment, had a run-in on the point with his Estonian Socialist comrade Toomas Ilves. 
Schultz recalled that ‘the Red Army made it possible to defeat Nazism and end the 
Shoah’, while Ilves regretted the fact that there were ‘two visions of History’, for 
‘Westerners did not suffer as we did behind the Iron Curtain’. The Socialist group 
was neatly split between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’; the divisive power of the 
Iron Curtain continues to exist in minds and memory. 
The unity of memory policy – a type of policy Europe has a penchant for – 
falls apart when symbols of the (ideological) partisan past are reconnected to the 
partisan present; here the line of separation once again reﬂ ects the left/right split. 
This was observable for PACE resolutions condemning the totalitarian, crime-
generating character of communism. The 2005 report by Göran Lindblad of the 
European People’s Party (EPP), approved on 25 January 2006, cited the ‘need 
for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes’ 
(Document 10765, Resolution 1481). This resolution fulﬁ lled the 1996 resolution 
(Document 7209, Resolution 1096, 3 January 1996) on ‘measures to dismantle the 
heritage of the former communist totalitarian systems’. It seems perfectly under-
standable that Western communist MEPs (also certain Western Socialists) were 
opposed to that resolution. Their vision of communism differs from Sovietism, 
and they had no intention of being branded with the same stigma, which would 
have amounted to excluding them from the democratic partisan arena. But such 
stigmatisation also frightened former Eastern communists, now converted to so-
cialism and social democracy. Their current partisan legitimacy depends very 
directly on their moves either to escape or deny that past. There are no names of 
any MEPs in the United European Left or European Left group (GUE, EL) on any 
of the documents signed in 1996, 2003 or 2006; those documents were approved 
primarily by right and centre-right MEPs (EPP and EDG – European Democrat 
Group). Here and there we see the signature of a Socialist group member.
PACE adopted the resolution condemning the crimes of the communist sys-
tem with a strong majority – ﬁ nal score: 99 to 42 – and most of the votes in favour 
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came from representatives of the former communist countries. But the move to 
recommend to the Committee of Ministers that the practical consequences of this 
condemnation be applied – an implementation decree requiring a two-thirds ma-
jority – did not pass.
These examples clearly outline the opposition between a European Union 
that practices normative reconciliation – the temptation to unify memory ofﬁ -
cially, as an integral part of the acquis communautaire, around the singularity of 
the Holocaust – and the will of new member states, recently emerged from the 
collapse of Sovietism, to get the experience of Soviet totalitarianism incorporated 
into the foundations of European historical legitimacy. We cannot understand 
this national-international scale game without analysing memory issues in for-
merly Sovietised Europe. 
The heritage of the memory of communism
In the East, the past is being used to re-arm partisan cleavages
The memory situation in post-communist Europe resembles one of free-ﬂ oating 
resources. The space of memory has not yet been stabilised, and its fault lines 
constitute memory veins or seams offering multiple resources. Memory of the 
pre-communist past is appealed to primarily through opposition to communism 
(patriotic acts and anti-communist resistance). Since 1989 the general tendency 
has been 1) to check the pasts of zealous regime agents and remove anyone re-
sponsible for state crimes from any kind of power, 2) simultaneously to de-com-
munise institutional structures, and 3) to teach the ill deeds of communism to the 
new generations. Policy applications, meanwhile, involve several scales of histori-
cising action that use several operation modes and concern a panoply of different 
memory ﬁ elds. On the institutional side there are lustration laws for people and 
de-communisation of structures, as well as public socialisation and information 
policies and systems such as archives for managing memory resources. On the 
side of social relations, there are citizen interactions (various victim associations), 
unregulated actions (organised leaks of lists of persons who collaborated with 
the political police); lastly, there are specialist communities and their scientiﬁ c 
studies, as well as interference in the historical ﬁ eld from journalist, judge, and 
MP ‘intruders’. In none of the post-communist countries today is there consensus 
on deﬁ nitively closing the ‘ﬁ le’ of the communist past. On the contrary, the im-
pression is that with time, the importance of that past is growing in political life, 
on the grounds that its moral and socio-political consequences have not really 
been checked, resolved, or overcome.
The communist/anti-communist political cleavage does not seem as strong 
as it was before 1989. This is true even in the Czech Republic, where a genuine 
communist party has survived, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, 
proud of its ﬁ liation and label. In fact, the past – especially the issue of collabora-
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tion with the communist regime – counts for much more than traditional politi-
cal cleavages in the post-communist political system. In Germany the initial law 
decreed that legal procedures would be null and void after ﬁ fteen years of access 
to the archives, but this time limit has been extended. In some cases – the former 
GDR, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic – judiciarisation came early 
and fast; laws were quickly promulgated and institutional arrangements put in 
place. Elsewhere, the absolutising of consensus and compromise, the peacemak-
ing mode negotiated at the end of the old regime, has slowed the decision -making 
process, namely because it has inhibited the development of clearly deﬁ ned par-
ties. It has been in the interests of political parties (rather than the transitional 
groups, frontists and unionists of 1989) to get involved in memory games and 
use historicising strategies to reawaken atrophied cleavages, even if this means 
intensifying dissent. However, opinions differ on the timing of these moves (too 
early? too late?) and on the different operation modes used. There seems no end 
in sight to any of the cases, and this means that the debate on how proﬁ table 
such strategies are has not reached any clear conclusions. Countries who took 
measures relatively late – Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovakians – have each 
in their own way magniﬁ ed the German example: to deal with their past of po-
lice persecution, the East Germans immediately (1991) passed a law opening the 
archives for consultation, scheduling that law to go out of effect on 21 December 
2006. However, we have seen that during the debate in the Bundestag on whether 
or not it was necessary to extend the period for ﬁ ve more years (November 2006), 
neither the seeming perfection of the administrative system for managing the 
Stasi archives nor the fact that it was put in place early had the expected effects. 
Consider the following comment, published in the 26 November 2006 issue of the 
Tageszeitung, expressing surprise at the virulence of the debate: ‘We were further 
along ten years ago than we are now. At that time everyone agreed that the GDR 
was a dictatorship with no respect for human dignity .... Today the antitotalitar-
ian consensus has grown porous.’
In fact, the idea that the communist past can be settled and deﬁ nitively 
closed in the name of a healthier democracy often involves a kind of normative 
presupposition. The rhetoric of some of the more zealous actors, those who call 
for deﬁ nitively turning the communist page by punishing the perpetrators of 
communist crimes, actually works to legitimate and promote precisely the oppo-
site aim: keeping the memory vein productive and exploitable as long as possi-
ble. Producing ‘dissensus’ around memory is a means of guaranteeing the speak-
ers a strong position on the partisan scene. Having archives that are not readily 
accessible actually works to support the deliberately maintained suspicion that 
those archives contain potentially inexhaustible hidden proof of the continuing 
existence of the enemy. Leaks – more or less planned – make people believe that 
reparative justice is being impeded by a network of enemy accomplices. They fuel 
the feeling that one enemy is hiding another: the hidden enemy – the old regime 
– must be protecting conﬁ dants of its former police.
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Institutional memory actors: the Ofﬁ ce of Joachim Gauck and the Institutes of Memory
Post-communist Europe has not chosen to imitate the Truth and Justice or Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions set up on several other continents, though from 
time to time appeals are made to follow those examples. This is because the no-
tion of reconciliation with the communist regime is not of much interest to the 
new rightist political parties, many of which are rooted in the protest against 
the ententes and compromises that were part of the negotiated revolutions. The 
argument often put forward in favour of the more disputatious option of radical 
lustration was that letting former agents of the regime go unpunished would en-
danger the newly acquired sovereignty of the country, since those agents might 
continue to work for a foreign power, in this case Russia. The countries most sen-
sitive to this argument were the Baltic states and Poland. For a decade the model 
most admired by post-communist countries was the one conceived by the Ger-
mans of the former GDR, particularly the former dissidents, who organised street 
demonstrations and strikes to oppose the proposal by the German Federal Re-
public representative at the July 1990 reuniﬁ cation negotiations that the archives 
be destroyed as soon as possible. Since its foundation in 1992, approximately two 
million German citizens have come to consult their ﬁ le in the renowned Ofﬁ ce 
run by the former dissident pastor Joachim Gauck and now by Marianne Birthler. 
The speciﬁ city of the Ofﬁ ce is that everyone has free access to their Stasi ﬁ le. Sev-
eral top-level politicians were unmasked as political police collaborators, though 
this did not hurt their political careers. But we often forget that the way of treat-
ing the East German past is not applicable in other contexts. Gauck never spoke 
of the biography veriﬁ cation process as one of de-communisation. He repeatedly 
stressed that SED Communist Party members and functionaries had nothing to 
fear. Manfred Stolpe, Social Democrat premier of the state of Brandenburg for sev-
eral years, responded to revelations of his collaboration with the Stasi by saying 
that the East German past was a period of dishonest little compromises, and that 
this was a common denominator in the memory of a great number of former East 
German nationals. He succeeded in eliciting a general reaction of understand-
ing, even sympathy, which then enabled him to win the federal state elections 
despite his past. Moreover, reuniﬁ cation made possible an exchange of elites: East 
German functionaries were simply replaced with West Germans rather then be-
ing de-communised. Finally, when the secret funding of the West German CDU 
party was discovered and Chancellor Helmut Kohl refused to give names, the 
Stasi ﬁ les could have helped in the investigation, but all German political parties 
were against this solution, going against Gauck’s own preference. The ghosts of 
the past can only act if today’s political actors want them to. Would reactivating them 
be proﬁ table in Germany today? Says Gauck, ‘Only 20% of Germans have put 
the experience of the communist dictatorship behind them. Most Germans are 
convinced that we must not forget the abyss of civilization of the Nazi period. But 
no such consensus exists for the communist dictatorship.’ And though the Bun-
destag did vote to prolong the period of accessibility to Stasi ﬁ les by ﬁ ve years, 
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it also annulled the requirement to check the past of every candidate for public 
ofﬁ ce, with the exception of federal government ofﬁ ces and a few speciﬁ c catego-
ries. The ofﬁ cial understanding is that the lustration process is fundamentally 
over. The several tens of thousands of positions covered by the former law have 
been reduced to a few dozen. Does this mean that the past can no longer serve in 
Germany to discredit people, and that the only historicising strategies that might 
be proﬁ table now are those of reconciliation and consensus? Hardly. The law had 
already been passed when Die Welt published a sensational report claiming that 
Gauck’s ofﬁ ce employed about ﬁ fty specialists who were themselves former Stasi 
agents. Memory trouble ﬂ ared up in Germany once again. 
The other post-communist European countries were forced to turn to less 
ambitious solutions than an equivalent of the Gauck Ofﬁ ce, with its annual budg-
et of € 100 million and its 2200 employees in charge of 160 kilometres of ﬁ les. 
Some of these countries – Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and at least in prin-
ciple Bulgaria – have authorised entirely free access to the archives; others limited 
access to victims of the regime, researchers, journalists and magistrates. Almost 
all the countries, with the exception of the Czech Republic, founded speciﬁ c insti-
tutions – institutes – for managing memory; the archives are located in these in-
stitutes. Some have archives that date from before the Second World War to 1990; 
they handle both totalitarianisms. In certain countries the lists of police collabora-
tors (contested in some cases) may be consulted online (for Slovakia, on the site of 
the Nation’s Memory Institute; for the Czech Republic, on the site of the archives 
of the Ministry of the Interior). Lists also circulate without institutional approval, 
for example, in the Czech Republic, where their purpose is to contest and supple-
ment the ofﬁ cial list, and in Poland, where twice now, in 1992 and 2005, they were 
used to pressure institutional actors and accelerate procedures for unmasking 
regime agents. The same is true for Hungary. In this ferment of initiatives, some 
countered by the powers that be, others generated by citizen movements or rev-
elations made by victims, also by historians without regard for the presumption 
of innocence or journalists eager for a scoop, the actors often mistake their tar-
gets. Several persons unjustly accused of being political police collaborators have 
ﬁ led complaints with the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg and some 
have won. In 2004, for example, the Lithuanian authorities had to pay heavy dam-
ages to two citizens whom they had removed from their jobs after accusations 
of collaboration. Rumours about ﬁ les being used by former agents to blackmail 
their former victims increase the feeling of insecurity, particularly when the ru-
mour is conﬁ rmed, as was the case in 2002 in Estonia when a Russian citizen sold 
the Estonian embassy in Moscow the ﬁ les on four hundred previously unknown 
KGB agents. The principle for recruiting historians and archivists applied in the 
Polish and Slovakian Institutes is interesting: according to their directors, young 
historians were preferred over older ones who had lived under the communist 
regime because the young were assumed to be without emotional prejudices. 
The results are hardly convincing given the confusion around the aims of these 
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institutes and how they are regulated.7 A number of young researchers have as-
sumed the role of prosecuting attorney and descended into the partisan arena. 
They are insensitive to the complexity of the ﬁ les. In Poland some are actually 
suspected of playing the game of the political parties they are close to; that is, 
facilitating the lustration of political enemies and keeping suspicions alive so as 
to compromise irreproachable political personalities who have chosen a politi-
cal option different from theirs. It has been suggested, for example, that because 
the hero of the Polish political opposition Jacek Kuron interviewed state agent 
informers, as shown in their notes, he was in the process of reaching an under-
standing with the communist regime. Bernadetta Gronek, head archivist of the 
Institute of National Memory in Warsaw, irritated by questions about the young 
historians’ impartiality, replied: ‘Despite a general fear on this point, we do not 
employ missionary lustrators. It is true that at the outset everyone was excited 
about having access to the country’s darkest secrets.’ (Polityka, 5 February 2005) 
What is to be feared is that through the game of partisan appointments, these 
institutes will become little more than instruments in less than honest hands for 
use in political contests. This is especially likely given that Institute employees 
perform several functions: classiﬁ cation, prosecution, and evaluating individual 
applicants to certain administrative positions. This offers a ﬁ eld of action for the 
many francs tireurs of partisan historicisation out to impinge on individual desti-
nies. History as a science is thus in danger of being reduced to the role of assist-
ant prosecuting attorney. The media are pleased to see historians taking up this 
role: they like having historian-judges pulling out ﬁ les and making accusations in 
front of their cameras instead of expounding on the context and complexity of the 
past. And they are particularly pleased with those who echo their own questions 
– Who gave the order? Who ratiﬁ ed it? Why haven’t the criminals been punished? 
– while neglecting the usual precautions. 
Until it is understood in Europe that the East’s memory games have speciﬁ c 
content linked to the past of the Second World War and Sovietisation, there can 
be no successful ‘Europeanisation’ of the histories of Europeans. 
7 In both Slovakia and Poland a number of researchers have moved to handle ‘shameful 
episodes’ of the past, namely co-participation by Slovakian and Polish citizens in the ex-
termination of Jews. The study by Poland’s Institute of National Memory on the massacre 
of the Jews of Jedwabne by their Polish fellow citizens is a monumental scientiﬁ c work, 
and on this basis it became implicated in the national debate on Polish responsibility. The 
study itself was conducted in reaction to a work by Jan Tomasz Gross, Les Voisins (The 
Neighbours) [2001]. It too often happens, however, that studies of the Shoah (including that 
of Jedwabne) are used by historians as an alibi to show that they are not obsessed with 
hunting down communist collaborators. 
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Conclusion
Should the European Union be thought of as a space for moralising the use of 
historicising strategies? Are we sufﬁ ciently armed to prevent the development of 
systematic use of memory strategies, that is, the systematic selection of proﬁ table 
metaphors and a voluntary recycling of memory intended to mobilise sensitive 
populations and thereby give the involved actors political weight in elections or 
even to develop a kind of anti-democratic weapons system? Does Europe have 
the ability (not to mention the vocation) to settle memory disputes once and for 
all? Is it in a position to impose a uniform vision of memory-related conﬂ icts, to-
gether with a normative vision of salvation where the saviour is the EU itself?
Many politicians are inviting us to construct a great unifying narrative which 
would have Europe as its miraculous recipient. The most readily copied, exported 
and otherwise propagated European model has been to institutionalise the work 
of historians aimed at pacifying antagonistic histories and memories. This model, 
ﬁ rst implemented with the German-French, Polish-German, and German-Czech 
joint historian commissions, has enjoyed much international circulation, all the 
way up to the recent encounter between Chinese and Japanese historians in De-
cember 2006 (Japan Times, 27 December 2006). A collective study of the Chinese-
Japanese case is planned for 2008; its minimal objective is to identify the facts in 
the wake of historical studies being done elsewhere, namely in Europe. 
But rather than create a new myth, would it not be preferable to accept the 
plurality of historical accounts as they are, subjective as they are, together with 
the plurality of traumatic memories, and have them dialogue with each other? 
In studying social memory-related developments in Europe, we need to 
look beyond the fundamental tendency to move toward reconciliation and con-
sensus, a tendency that developed in response to the effects of exiting inter-ethnic 
or interstate conﬂ icts or authoritarian regimes, beginning with the Second World 
War, conﬂ icts and regimes that are still making themselves felt in the form of 
multiple effects in Europe. It seems to me imperative to take into account and 
analyse the increasing number of ‘dissensus’ games affecting countries engaged 
in constructing life after conﬂ ict and the set of countries that began exiting the 
authoritarian system in the 1970s. 
Europe is run through and through with traces of former inter-state and 
inter-ethnic conﬂ icts. Experience shows that it is always possible to reactivate 
those conﬂ icts, regardless of the various ways they were resolved in the past. 
History readily sits itself down at the table of the present, as attested by the cur-
rent mobilisations of actors, victim populations and despoiled groups who were 
forgotten in post-conﬂ ict arrangements or forced into silence. And on the basis 
of this reality, various interest groups, political parties, and states are develop-
ing memory resources and incorporating historicising strategies into their action 
repertoires, the aim being to ‘recycle’ representations of ‘painful’ pasts in current 
political issues and contests. These mobilisations then run into the reconcilia-
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tion tendency that either developed spontaneously in civil society (in informal 
groups and NGOs, for example) or is being steered by national and international 
institutions. That tendency is becoming increasingly routine, due among other 
things to the circulation of ‘good’ models for pacifying resentment, models often 
strongly normative in tone. Anyone wishing to push forward the construction 
of Europe and improve the way institutions handle post-conﬂ ict situations must 
reckon with all these phenomena, constituent components of the axiological real-
ity of the European space. 
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